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tion in a low-income country by experimentally allocating uncon-
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only increase in H along with higher teacher wages. This differen-
tial impact follows from a canonical oligopoly model with capacity
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aging market structure in designing educational subsidies.
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1Government intervention in education is often predicated on market failures.1
However, addressing such failures does not require government provision. This
recognition has allowed alternate schooling models that separate the financing
and provision of education by the state to emerge. These range from vouchers
in developing countries (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Muralidharan et al., 2015;
Barrera-Osorio et al., 2017) to charter schools in the United States (Hoxby and
Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby et al., 2009; Angrist et al., 2013; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.,
2016) and, more recently, to public–private partnership arrangements with pri-
vate school chains (Romero et al., 2017). One key consideration is that the impact
of these interventions is mediated by the underlying market structure. Yet, es-
tablishing the causal impact of such policies on schools and understanding how
the impact is mediated by program design and the prevailing market structure is
challenging.
The rise of private schooling in low- and middle-income countries offers an
opportunity to map policies to school responses by designing market-level inter-
ventions that uncover and address underlying market failures. In previous work,
we have leveraged “closed” education markets in rural Pakistan to identify labor
and informational market failures and evaluated interventions that ameliorate
them and improve education outcomes (Andrabi et al., 2013, 2017).2 In addi-
tion to these failures, data from our longitudinal study of rural schooling markets
and interviews with school owners suggest that private schools also lack access to
financing, with few external funding sources outside their own families.
Here, we present results from an experiment that alleviated financial constraints
for private schools in rural Pakistan. We study how this intervention affects
educational outcomes and how variations in intervention design interact with
market structure. Specifically, our experiment allocates an unconditional cash
grant of Rs.50,000 ($500 and 15 percent of the median annual revenue for sample
schools) to each treated (private) school from a sample of 855 private schools in
266 villages in the province of Punjab, Pakistan. We assign villages to a control
group and one of two treatment arms: In the first treatment, referred to as the
‘low-saturation’ or L arm, we offer the grant to a single, randomly assigned,
private school within the village (from an average of 3.3 private schools). In
the second treatment, the ‘high-saturation’ or H arm, all private schools in the
experimentally assigned village are offered the Rs.50,000 grant.
The motivation for this experimental design is twofold. First, it helps examine
whether limited financial access hinders private school quality and expansion.
Even if private schools lack access to finance, it is not immediately clear that the
1Examples include credit market failures for households (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002), the lack
of long-term contracting between parents and children (Jensen, 2012), and the social externalities from
education (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000).
2Private sector primary enrollment shares are 40 percent in countries like India and Pakistan and
28 percent in all LMIC combined with significant penetration in rural areas (Baum et al., 2013; Andrabi
et al., 2015). Because villages are “closed”— children attend schools in the village and schools in the
village are mostly attended by children in the village— it is both easier to define markets and to isolate
the impact of interventions on a schooling market as a whole.
2results from the small and medium enterprises (SME) literature will extend to
education (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012; de Mel et al., 2012).3 Second, our design
allows us to assess whether the nature of financing— in our case, the extent of
market saturation with unconditional grants— affects equilibrium outcomes. This
saturation design is motivated by our previous research documenting the role of
market competition in determining supply-side responses (Andrabi et al., 2017)
as well as concerns that the return on funds may be smaller if all firms in the
market receive financing (Rotemberg, 2014). Intervening experimentally in this
manner thus presents a unique opportunity to better understand school reactions
to changes in access to finance and link them to models of firm behavior and
financial access in the literature on industrial organization.
We start with two main results. First, the provision of the grant leads to
greater expenditures in both treatment arms with no evidence that treated schools
in either arms used the grant to substitute away from more expensive forms
of capital, such as informal loans to the school owner’s household. Following
Banerjee and Duflo (2012), this suggests the presence of credit constraints in our
setting. It also confirms that the money was used to make additional investments
in the school even though the cash grants were unconditional.
Second, school responses differ across the two treatment arms. In the L arm,
treated (Lt) schools enroll an additional 22 children, but there are no average
increases in test scores or fees. We do not detect any impact on untreated (Lu)
private schools in this arm. In the H arm, enrollment increases are smaller at
9 children per school. Unlike the L arm however, test scores improve by 0.22
standard-deviations for children in these schools, accompanied by an increase in
tuition fees by Rs.19 (8 percent of baseline fees). Revenue increases among H
schools therefore reflect both an increase in enrollment and in fees. Even so,
revenue increases in the H arm still fall short relative to that in Lt schools:
Although we cannot reject equal revenue increases in Lt and H schools, the point
estimates for the former are consistently larger.
Our theoretical framework highlights why Lt schools expand capacity while H
schools improve test scores (with smaller capacity expansion). We first extend
the canonical model of Bertrand duopoly competition with capacity constraints
due to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to allow for vertically differentiated firms.
Then, using the same rationing rule, whereby students are allocated to the schools
that produce the highest value for them, we prove that expanding financial access
to both firms in the same market is more likely to lead to quality improvements.
Here, ‘more likely’ implies that the parameter space under which quality improve-
ments occur as an equilibrium response is larger in H relative to L arm.
3Despite better access to finance, parents may be unable to discern and pay for quality improvements;
school owners themselves may not know what innovations increase quality; alternate uses of such funds
may give higher returns; or bargaining within the family may limit how these funds can be used to improve
schooling outcomes (de Mel et al., 2012). Alternatively, financial constraints may be exacerbated in the
educational sector with fewer resources that can be used as collateral, social considerations that hinder
collection and enforcement, and outcomes that are multi-dimensional and difficult to value for lenders.
3The key intuition is as follows: When schools face capacity constraints, they
make positive profits even when they provide the same quality. This is the fa-
miliar result that Bertrand competition with capacity constraints recovers the
Cournot equilibrium (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). If only one school receives
an additional grant, it behaves like a monopolist on the residual demand from
the capacity constrained school: The (untreated) credit-constrained school cannot
react by increasing investments since these reactions require credit. The treated
school now faces a trade-off between increasing revenue by bringing in additional
children or increasing quality. While the former brings in additional revenue
through children who were not in the school previously, the latter increases rev-
enues from children already enrolled in the school. To the extent that the school
can increase market share without poaching from other private schools, it will
choose to expand capacity as it can increase enrollment without triggering a price
war that leads to a loss in profits. In this model, Lt schools should increase en-
rollment, but not beyond the point where they would substantially ‘poach’ from
other private schools and must rely instead on primarily attracting children from
public schools or those not currently attending school. We indeed find increases
in enrollment in Lt schools without a discernible decline in the enrollment of Lu
schools.
On the other hand, if both schools receive the grant money, neither school can
behave like the residual monopolist and this makes it more likely that they invest
in quality. The logic is as follows. If both schools attempt to increase capacity
equally, this makes a price war more likely, leading to a low-payoff equilibrium.
There are only two ways around this adverse competitive effect: schools must ei-
ther increase the overall size of the market or must retain some degree of market
power in equilibrium. Investing in quality allows for both as the overall revenue
in the market increases, and schools can relax market competition through (ver-
tical) product differentiation. Investments in quality thus protect positive profits,
although these are not as high as in the L case.4
The model assumes that schools know how to increase quality but are respond-
ing to market constraints in choosing not to do so. This is consistent with our
previous work showing that low cost private schools are able to improve test scores
without external training or inputs (Andrabi et al., 2017). How they choose to
do so is of independent interest for estimates of education production functions.
We therefore further empirically investigate changes in school inputs to shed light
on the channels through which schools are able to attract more students or raise
test scores. We find that Lt schools invest in desks, chairs and computers. Mean-
while, while H schools invest in these items as well, they also spend money on
upgrading classrooms, on libraries, and on sporting facilities. More significantly,
the wage bill in H schools increased, reflecting increased pay for both existing
4In equilibrium, all schools in a village may invest in quality if the cost of quality investment is
sufficiently small and the schools’ existing capacities are sufficiently close to their Cournot optimal
capacities.
4and new teachers. Bau and Das (2016) show that a 1 standard deviation increase
in teacher value-added increases student test scores by 0.15sd in a similar sam-
ple from Punjab, and, in the private sector, this higher value-added is associated
with 41% higher wages. A hypothesis consistent with the test score increases in H
schools is that schools used higher salaries to retain and recruit higher value-added
teachers.
Given the different responses under the two treatment arms, it is natural to ask
which one is more socially desirable. Accurate welfare estimates require strong
assumptions, but we can provide suggestive estimates. While school owners see
a large increase in their profits under the L arm, this is comparable to the esti-
mated gain in welfare that parents obtain under the H arm, driven by test score
improvements. If, in addition, we factor in that society at large may value test
scores gains over and above parental valuations, then the H treatment is more
socially desirable. Higher weights to teacher salaries compared to owner profits
strengthen this conclusion further.
This analysis highlights a tension between market-based and socially preferred
outcomes. Left to the market, a private financier would prefer to finance a single
school in each village; theH arm however is preferable for society. A related policy
question is then whether the government would want to subsidize the private
sector to lend in a manner that multiple schools receive loans in the same village.
To the extent that a lender is primarily concerned with greater likelihood of
default and using the fact that school closures were 9 percentage points lower in
the L arm, a plausible form of this subsidy is a loan-loss guarantee for private
investors. We estimate that the expected cost of such a guarantee is a third of the
gain in consumer surplus suggesting that such a policy may indeed be desirable.
Interestingly, this also implies that the usual “priority sector” lending policies
need to be augmented with a “geographical targeting” subsidy that rewards the
market for increasing financial saturation in a given area–the density of coverage
matters.
Our paper contributes to the literatures on education and on SMEs, with a focus
on financial constraints to growth and innovation. In education, efforts to improve
test scores include direct interventions in the production function; improvements
in allocative efficiency through vouchers or school matching algorithms; and struc-
turing partnerships to select privately operated schools using public funding.5 As
a complement to this literature, we have focused on the impact of policies that
alter the overall operating environments for schools, leaving school inputs and en-
rollment choices to be determined in equilibrium. Such policies, especially when
5McEwan (2015), Evans and Popova (2015), and JPAL (2017), provide reviews of the ‘production
function’ approach (the causal impact of changing specific school, teacher, curriculum, parent or student
inputs in the education production function) to improving test scores. Recent studies with considerable
promise tailor teaching to the level of the child rather than curricular standards— see Banerjee et al.
(2017) and Muralidharan et al. (2016). Examples of approaches designed to increase allocative efficiency
include a literature on vouchers (see Epple et al. (2015) for a critical review) and school matching
algorithms (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2009; Ajayi, 2014; Kapor et al., 2017).
5they address market failures, are increasingly relevant for education with the rise
of market-based providers, where flexibility allows schools to respond to changes
in the local policy regime.6 In two previous papers, we have shown that these
features permit greater understanding of the role of teacher availability (Andrabi
et al., 2013) as well as information about school performance for private school
growth and test scores (Andrabi et al., 2017).
Closest to our approach of evaluating financing models for schools are two recent
papers from Liberia and Pakistan. In Liberia, Romero et al. (2017) show that a
PPP arrangement brought in 7 school operators, each of whom managed several
schools with evidence of test-score increases, albeit at costs that were higher than
business-as-usual approaches. In Pakistan, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2017) study
a program where new schools were established by local private operators using
public funding on a per-student basis. Again, test scores increased. Further,
decentralized input optimization came close to what a social welfare maximizing
government could achieve by tailoring school inputs to local demand. However,
these interventions are not designed to exploit competitive forces within markets.
Viewed through this lens, our contributions are twofold. First, we extend our
market-level interventions approach to the provision of grants to private schools
and track the effects of this new policy on test scores and enrollment. Second, we
confirm that the specific design of subsidy schemes matter (Epple et al., 2015) in
the context of a randomized controlled trial, and show that these design effects
are consistent with (an extension of) the theory of oligopolistic competition with
credit constraints. In doing so, we are able to directly isolate the link between
policy and school level responses.7
Our paper also contributes to an ongoing discussion in the SME literature on
how best to use financial instruments to engender growth. Previous work from the
SME literature consistently finds high returns to capital for SMEs in low-income
countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2012; de Mel et al., 2008, 2012; Udry and Anagol,
2006). A more recent literature raises the concern that these returns may be
“crowded out” when credit becomes more widely available if these returns are due
to diversion of profits from one firm to another (Rotemberg, 2014). We are able to
extend this literature to a service like education and simultaneously demonstrate
a key trade-off between low and high-saturation approaches. While low-saturation
infusions may lead SMEs to invest more in capacity and increase market share
at the expense of other providers, high-saturation infusions can induce firms to
offer better value to the consumer and effectively grow the size of the market by
6Private schools in these markets face little (price/input) regulation, rarely receive public subsidies
and, optimize based on local economic factors. Public school inputs are governed through an adminis-
trative chain that starts at the province and includes the districts. While we can certainly see changes
in locally controlled inputs (such as teacher effort), it is harder for government schools to respond to
local policy shocks with a centralized policy change. In Andrabi et al. (2018), we examine the impact of
similar grants to public schools, which addresses government rather than market failures.
7Isolating the causal link between policies and educational improvements that is due to school re-
sponses (as opposed to compositional changes) has proven difficult. Large-scale policies usually change
how children sort across schools, making it difficult to find an appropriate control group for the policy.
6“crowding in” innovations and increasing quality. That the predictions of our
experiment are consistent with a canonical model of firm behavior establishes
further parallels between the private school market and small enterprises. Like
these enterprises, private schools cannot sustain negative profits, obtain revenue
from fee paying students, and operate in a competitive environment with multiple
public and private providers. We have shown previously that, with these features,
the behavior of private schools can be approximated by standard economic models
in the firm literature (Andrabi et al., 2017). If the returns to alleviating financial
constraints for private schools are as large as those documented in the literature
on SMEs, the considerable learnings from the SME literature becomes applicable
to this sector as well (Beck, 2007; de Mel et al., 2008; Banerjee and Duflo, 2012).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 outlines the
context; Section 2 presents the theoretical framework; Section 3 describes the
experiment, the data, and the empirical methodology; Section 4 presents and
discusses the results; and Section 5 concludes.
I. Setting and Context
The private education market in Pakistan has grown rapidly in the last three
decades. In Punjab, the largest province in the country and the site of our study,
the number of private schools increased from 32,000 in 1990 to 60,000 in 2016
with the fastest growth taking place in rural areas of the province. In 2010-11,
38% of all enrollments among children between the ages of 6 and 10 was in private
schools (Nguyen and Raju, 2014). These schools operate in environments with
substantial school choice and competition; in our study district, 64% of villages
have at least one private school, and within these villages there is a median of
5 (public and private) schools (NEC, 2005). Our previous work has shown that
these schools are not just for the wealthy; 18 percent of the poorest third send
their children to private schools in villages where they existed (Andrabi et al.,
2009). One reason for this success is better learning. While absolute levels of
learning are below curricular standards across all types of schools, test scores of
children enrolled in private schools are 1 standard deviation higher than for those
in public schools, which is a difference of 1.5 to 2.5 years of learning (depending
on the subject) by Grade 3 (Andrabi et al., 2009). These differences remain large
and significant after accounting for selection into schooling using the test score
trajectories of children who switch schools (Andrabi et al., 2011).
A second reason for this success is that private schools have managed to keep
their fees low; in our sample, the median private school reports a fee of Rs.201 or
$2 per month, which is less than half the daily minimum wage in the province. We
have argued previously that the ‘business model’ of these private schools relies
on the local availability of secondary school educated women with low salaries
and frequent churn (Andrabi et al., 2008). In villages that have a secondary
school for girls, there is a steady supply of such potential teachers, but also
frequent bargaining between teachers and school owners around wage setting—
in the teacher market, a 1sd increase in teacher value-added is associated with a
741% increase in wages (Bau and Das, 2016). A typical teacher in our sample is
female, young and unmarried, and is likely to pause employment after marriage
and her subsequent move to the marital home. An important feature of this
market is that the occupational choice for teachers is not between public and
private schools: Becoming a teacher in the public sector requires a college degree,
and an onerous and highly competitive selection process as earnings are 5-10
times as much as private school teachers and applicants far outweigh the intake.
Accordingly, transitions from public to private school teaching and vice versa are
extremely rare.
Despite their successes in producing higher test-scores at low costs, once a
village has a private school, future quality improvements appear to be limited.
We have collected data through the Learning and Educational Achievement in
Pakistan Schools (LEAPS) panel for 112 villages in rural Punjab, each of which
reported a private school in 2003. Over five rounds of surveys spanning 2003 to
2011, tests scores remain constant in “control” villages that were not exposed to
any interventions from our team. Furthermore, there is no evidence of an increase
in the enrollment share of private schools or greater allocative efficiency whereby
more children attend higher quality schools. This could represent a (very) stable
equilibrium, but could also be consistent with the presence of systematic con-
straints that impede the growth potential of this sector.
This study focuses on one such constraint: access to finance. This focus on
finance is driven, in part, by what school owners themselves tell us. In our
survey of 800 school owners, two-thirds report that they want to borrow, but
only 2% percent report any borrowing for school related loans.8 School owners
wish to make a range of investments to improve school performance as well as
their revenues and profits. The most desired investments are in infrastructure,
especially additional classrooms and furniture, which owners report as the primary
means of increasing revenues. While also desirable, school owners find raising
revenues through better test scores and therefore higher fees a somewhat riskier
proposition. Investments like teacher training that may directly impact learning
are thought to be risky as they may not succeed (the training may not be effective
or a trained teacher may leave) and even if they do, they may be harder to
demonstrate and monetize.
The Pakistani educational landscape therefore presents an active and compet-
itive educational marketplace, but one where schools may face significant con-
straints, including financial, that may limit their growth and innovation. This
setting suggests that alleviating financial constraints may have positive impacts
on educational outcomes; whether these impacts arise due to infrastructure or
pedagogical improvements depends on underlying features of the market and the
competitive pressure schools face.
8This is despite the fact that school owners are highly educated and integrated with the financial
system: 65 percent have a college degree; 83 percent have at least high school education; and 73 percent
have access to a bank account.
8II. Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical exercise consists of two parts that shed light on the market
level impacts of an increase in financial resources. First, we introduce credit
constrained firms and quality into the canonical Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
framework (henceforth KS).9 Schools in our model are willing to increase their
capacities or qualities (to charge higher fees) but are credit constrained beyond
their initial capital. Second, we introduce comparative static exercises through
the provision of unconditional grants and study the equilibrium with varying
degrees of financial saturation. Our approach of extending a canonical model
disciplines the theory exercise and provides us with a robust conceptual framework
to conduct empirical analysis and interpret findings.
A. Setup
Two identical private schools, indexed by i = 1, 2, choose whether to invest
in capacity, xi ≥ 0, or quality, qt, where t ∈ {H,L} is high or low quality.
High quality is conceptualized as investments that allow schools to offer better
quality/test scores and charge higher prices, such as specialty infrastructure (e.g.
library or sports facility) or higher-quality teachers. Low quality investments,
such as basic infrastructure (desks or chairs) or basic renovations, allow schools
to retain or increase enrollment but do not change existing students’ willingness
to pay.
SCHOOLS: Each school i maximizes Πi = (pi− c)xei +Ki− rxi−wt subject to
rxi + wt ≤ Ki and xei ≤ xi, where xei is the enrollment, pi is the price of school i
per seat, c is the constant marginal cost for a seat, r is the fixed cost for a seat, wt
is the fixed cost for quality type, and Ki is the amount of fixed capital available
to the school. Schools face the same marginal and fixed costs for investments.
The fixed cost for low quality is normalized to 0, and so w is the fixed cost of
delivering high quality.10
STUDENTS: There are T students each of whom demands only one seat. Each
student j has a taste parameter for quality θj and maximizes utility U(θj , qt, pi) =
θjqt− pi by choosing a school with quality qt and fee pi. The value of the outside
option is zero for all students, and students choose to go to school as long as U ≥ 0.
We initially assume students are homogeneous with θ = 1. Later, we show our
results hold when the model is extended to allow for consumer heterogeneity.
TIMING: The investment game has three stages. In the first stage, schools
simultaneously choose their capacity and quality. After observing these choices,
schools simultaneously choose their prices in the second stage. Demand is realized
in the final stage. Standard allocation rules are assumed.11
9KS (1983) develop a model of firm behavior under binding capacity commitments. In their model,
the Cournot equilibrium is recovered as the solution to a Bertrand game with capacity constraints.
10Alternative parameterizations for the profit function including allowing for school heterogeneity,
will naturally lead to different sets of equilibrium outcomes. However, our main results, which are
concerned with the comparisons between the H and L treatments, will remain unaffected as long as
parameterizations do not vary by treatment arm. We discuss this point further at the end of this section.
11We assume: (i) The school offering the higher surplus to students serves the entire market up to
9B. Equilibrium Analysis
We first examine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (NE) of this investment
game at baseline and then assess how the equilibrium changes in the L arm where
only one school receives a grant K > 0, and in the H arm where both schools
receive the same grant K. The receipt of grants is common knowledge among all
schools in a given market.
An Example
Prior to the full analysis, consider the following example to build intuition for
the pricing decisions of schools. Suppose that the fixed cost of quality is w = 8;
the cost of expanding capacity by one unit is r = 1; and, there are 30 (identical)
consumers who value qL at $3 and qH at $5. The marginal cost of each enrolled
student is c = 0.
Capacity constrained schools and student homogeneity suggests the existence
of an uncovered market in the baseline equilibrium. That is, there are students
willing to attend a (private) school at the prevailing price but cannot do so because
schools do not have the capacity to accommodate these students.12 Without loss
of generality (WLOG), we assume that in the baseline, schools produce low quality
and cannot seat more than 10 students each. Therefore, the size of the uncovered
market is N = 10. Both schools charge $3 and earn a profit of $3 per child for a
total profit of $30. Given capacity constraints, decreasing the price only lowers
school profits.
In the L arm, a single school receives $9, which it can spend on expanding
capacity by 9 units or increasing quality and expanding capacity by 1 unit. Com-
paring profits establishes that capacity expansions are favored with a profit of
$57.13
In the H arm, each of the two schools receives $9. First, consider the subgame
where both schools invest in capacity so that the overall market capacity expands
to 38, which is more than the 30 children in the village. In this subgame, there is
no pure strategy NE. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, schools will randomize
between $3 and $3319 (≈ $1.74) with a continuous and atomless probability distri-
bution and obtain an (expected) profit of $33.14 However, the subgame where
both schools invest in capacity is not consistent with equilibrium in the full game,
its capacity and the residual demand is met by the other school; (ii) If schools set the same price and
quality, market demand is split in proportion to their capacities as long as their capacities are not met;
(iii) If schools choose different qualities but offer the same surplus, then the school offering the higher
quality serves the entire market up to its capacity and the residual demand is met by the other school.
12These rationed students may instead enroll in public schools in the village, an outside option in this
model, or not attend any school at all.
13If the school expands capacity, it enrolls 9 more children for a total profit of 19×3=$57. In contrast,
if it invests in quality it receives (10 + 1)× 5=$55.
14To see why, note that $3 is not an equilibrium price since a school can deviate by charging $3− and
enrolling 19 children while the other school obtains the residual demand of 30− 19 = 11. Alternatively,
$0 is not an equilibrium price either— deviating to $0 +  with an enrollment of 11 yields a positive
profit as the other school cannot enroll more than 19 children. To derive the mixed strategy equilibrium,
schools must be indifferent between any two prices in the support of the mixing distribution. Suppose
one school charges $3. Given that the mixing distribution is atomless, the price of the other school must
be lower. Therefore, the school that charges $3 is price undercut for sure and it will obtain the residual
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where schools can also choose quality. Specifically, if one school deviates and in-
vests $8 in quality and $1 in an additional chair instead, then schools could serve
the entire market of 30 children without a price war and the deviating school
would charge $5 for a total profit of $55, which is higher than $33.
The possibility of a price war thus compels schools to not spend the entire
grant on capacity expansion when the size of uncovered market is ‘small.’ Now
consider the case where each school buys 5 additional chairs, serves 15 students,
and keeps the remaining $4. In this case, equilibrium dictates that each school
should charge a price of $3 and achieve profit of $49. However, investing in
5 additional chairs is also not consistent with equilibrium because one of the
schools would profitably deviate and invest in quality and one additional chair
for a profit of $55. Therefore, when the size of the uncovered market is sufficiently
small, at least one of the schools will switch to quality investments instead of a
partial expansion in capacity. In fact, the only equilibrium in this case is such that
one school expands quality with a profit of $55 and the other expands capacity
with a profit of $57. If the uncovered market size had been less than 10, then
both schools investing in quality would be consistent with equilibrium because
the school that deviates cannot fully utilize the grant to avoid price competition
with a rival offering higher quality.
Full Analysis
Consider first the baseline scenario. As before, WLOG, we consider the case
where schools produce low quality initially. It is straightforward to show that
in the unique baseline equilibrium, schools enroll the same number of students,
M
2 (where M < T refers to the covered market and N = T −M is the size of
the uncovered market) and charge the same price p = qL, extract full consumer
surplus and earn positive profits. Schools do not lower prices since they cannot
meet the additional demand.
Now consider the impact of the grants. When schools receive additional financ-
ing, they can increase capacity at the risk of price competition or increase quality
at a (possibly) higher cost. Our previous example illustrates the tension between
these two strategies. Two key parameters influence the investment strategies of
schools, the cost of quality, w, and the size of the uncovered market, N . When
both w and N are very low, schools prefer to invest in quality in both treatment
arms. For sufficiently high values of w, schools in both treatments prefer to invest
in capacity as long as N is quite large. As N decreases, schools will invest in ca-
pacity as long as increasing revenues through new students is more rewarding than
increasing revenues among existing students through higher quality and prices,
but spend less of their grants to escape from price competition. At a threshold
level of N , at least one of the schools switches to quality investment instead of
demand of 11 children and a profit of $33. Now consider a lower bound, y, of the mixing distribution.
Suppose one school charges y. Then it must be the case that it price undercuts the other school and
obtains a demand of 19. But the school must be indifferent between charging $3 and charging y, which
implies that $33 = 19× y, or y ≈ 1.74.
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a partial expansion in capacity. This threshold for N decreases as w increases,
suggesting a negative relationship between the two. We formally prove these
claims for both treatment arms and characterize the wN−space where quality
investment by at least one school is consistent with equilibrium.
Because the schools are credit constrained, they cannot afford high quality if
its cost is greater than the grant size. Therefore, we are concerned with the part
of the wN−space where quality investment is feasible, i.e. w ≤ K. We also
parametrize the size of the grant, K, to be neither ‘too small’ nor ‘too large.’
In particular, we assume that K is large enough such that investing in quality
is not always the optimal action but small enough so that rate of return of each
investment is positive.15
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Figure 1a: Low-saturation Treatment
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Figure 1b: High-saturation Treatment
Theorem 1. The shaded regions EL and EH in Figure 1 represent the set of
parameters in wN−space where there exists an equilibrium of the investment game
in the low and high-saturation treatment, respectively, such that (at least one)
treated school invests in quality.
All the proofs are presented in Appendix A1. Suppose that the size of the
uncovered market is sufficiently large such that the Lt school cannot cover it even
if it spends the entire grant on capacity, i.e. K/r ≤ N . If this school increases
capacity, then the gain in profits is equal to the return on each new student
times the number of new students, (qL − c)Kr . If it increases quality instead,
then the gain in profits is equal to the sum of (i) increase in return on existing
students from the higher price times the number of existing students and (ii) the
return from higher quality to each new student times the number of new students,
(qH − qL)M2 + (qH − c)K−wr . Therefore, investing in capacity is more profitable if
15We suppose that k < K < k¯ where k = Mr
2
(
qH−qL
ql−c
)
and k¯ = M
2
(qH − qL). If the inequality
k < K does not hold, then the revenue from capacity investment, K
r
(qL − c), is lower than revenue from
quality (only) investment, M
2
(qH − qL), and thus, quality investment is always optimal. The rate of
return from capacity investment is positive because we assume qL − c − r > 0. Finally, K < k¯ implies
that rate of return from quality (only) investment is always positive. This assumption is not essential
for our results, and in Appendix A1, we show how equilibrium sets would change if we relax it.
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the former term is greater than the latter, yielding the condition w > w∗ where
w∗ = r
(
qH−qL
qH−c
)(
M
2 +
K
r
)
. However, if the size of the uncovered market is smaller,
in particularN < Kr , then spending the entire grant on additional capacity implies
that the treated school must steal some students from the rival school, resulting
in a price war and lower payoffs. In order to avoid lower payoffs, the treated
school will partially invest in capacity. The line L indicates the parameters w
and N that equate the treated school’s profit from quality investment to its profit
from partial capacity investment.16
On the other hand, schools will never engage in a price war in the H arm as
long as the uncovered market size is large enough, so that schools cannot cover it
even if both spend the entire grant on capacity, i.e. 2Kr ≤ N . Therefore, for these
values of N , equilibrium predictions will be no different than the L arm. However,
when N is less than 2Kr , spending the entire grant on additional capacity implies
that the school must steal some students from the rival school, resulting again
in a price war. The constraint indicating the indifference between profit from
quality investment and from partial capacity investment, the line H in Figure 1b,
is much farther out because now both schools can invest in capacity, and hence
price competition is likely even for higher values of the uncovered market size,
N .17 The next result is self evident from the last two figures and thus provided
with no formal proof.
Corollary 1 (Homogeneous Consumers). If the treated school in the low-
saturation treatment invests in quality, then there must exist an equilibrium in
the high-saturation treatment that at least one school invests in quality. However,
the converse is not always true.
C. Generalization of the Model and Discussion
Consumer Heterogeneity
Now, we extend our analysis by incorporating consumer heterogeneity in will-
ingness to pay. We assume that students’ taste parameter for quality θj is uni-
formly distributed over [0, 1], resulting in a downward sloping demand curve.
Specifically, if the schools’ quality and price are q and p, respectively, then de-
mand is D(p) = T (1− pq ). Unlike the case with homogeneous consumers, there are
never students who would like to enroll in a school at the existing price but are
rationed out— prices always rise to ensure that the marginal student is kept at her
reservation utility. Nevertheless, our previous intuition will carry forward. The
driving force for our results in the homogeneous case was the tension between the
uncovered market and the schools’ actual capacities; in the heterogeneous case,
the role of the uncovered market is played by the schools’ Cournot best response
capacities, akin to KS (1983).
In the formal exposition in Appendix A2, we maintain the entire KS framework,
16More formally, L represents the line (qH − c)
(
M
2
+ K−w
r
)
= (qL − c)
(
M
2
+N
)
+K −Nr.
17More formally, H represents the line (qH − c)(M2 + K−wr ) = (qL − c)(M2 +N − Kr )−Nr.
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including their rationing rule, and prove two results. We first show that if schools
can choose quality, there always exists a pure strategy NE.18 We then prove that,
as in the case of homogeneous consumers, if both schools invest in capacity in the
H arm, this makes capacity expansion beyond the Cournot best response levels
more likely, thereby increasing the likelihood of price competition. It is thus more
likely that (at least one) treated school in the H arm will invest in quality. Using
this intuition, we prove a version of Theorem 1 under a mild set of parameter
restrictions discussed in Appendix A2.
Theorem 2 (Heterogeneous Consumers). If the treated school in the low-
saturation treatment invests in quality, then there must exist an equilibrium in the
high-saturation treatment where at least one school invests in quality. However,
the converse is not always true.
Potential Extensions
There are a number of other plausible modifications that could be made to the
model. For instance, we could introduce risk-averse owners who are insurance
(rather than credit) constrained, or introduce a degree of altruism in the profit
function to allow for school owners who intrinsically care about the number of
children in school. We can also allow quality to be a continuous variable and
also move beyond our static setting to introduce dynamic considerations such as
over-investment to deter entry. These modifications potentially change the set
of parameters supporting equilibria where (at least one) treated school invests in
quality. However, our theorems will remain unchanged as long as these changes
affect the schools’ profit functions symmetrically in each treatment arm. In this
case, the risk of price competition will still be higher in the H arm, and thus
quality investment will still be more likely in H than the L arm.
On the other hand, adjustments to the model that generate asymmetric pa-
rameterization of the profit function in each treatment arm may alter our main
results. For example, if school owners have the ability to collectively affect the
market size or input prices (e.g. higher competition among schools may raise
teachers’ salaries), then the return or cost of an investment would be different in
each treatment arm, which may meaningfully change our results. Given that the
total resources available in a village vary across treatment arms, we assess this
possibility further in Section IV.A and show that it is not empirically salient in
our case.
To summarize, our model provides insights on how schools in the two treatment
arms respond to a relaxation of credit constraints, either by increasing revenue
18The intuition follows from the nature of the profit function. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the
KS game is due to discontinuities in the profit function. When both firms produce the same quality, if
one price undercuts the other, then it takes all consumers up to its capacity and sees a discontinuous
jump in profits. When firms are differentiated in quality, profits always change smoothly as the marginal
consumer’s valuation distribution is atomless. If all consumers are homogeneous as before however, even
with differentiated quality, the smoothness in consumer demand vanishes and we again find no pure
strategy equilibria in the game.
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from existing consumers or expanding market share and risking price competi-
tion. Our main result is that we are more likely to observe higher enrollment in
treated schools in the L arm and higher quality (and increased fees) in the H arm.
Moreover, private profits will be higher for Lt schools. Although, conceptually, a
test of the theory can be based on variation in the size of the uncovered market
and the cost of quality investments, these are not observed in the data. Therefore,
we focus attention in our empirical results on the difference in impact between
low and high-saturation villages.
III. Experiment, Data and Empirical Methods
A. Experiment
Our intervention tests the impact of increasing financial access for schools for
outcomes guided by theory (revenue, expenditures, enrollment, fees and quality
captured as test scores) and assesses whether this impact varies by the degree of
financial saturation in the market. Our intervention has three features: (i) it is
carried out only with private schools where all decisions are made at the level of
the school;19 (ii) we vary financial saturation in the market by comparing villages
where only one (private) school receives a grant (L arm) versus villages where
all (private) schools receive grants (H arm); and (iii) we never vary the grant
amount at the school level, which remains fixed at Rs.50,000.
Randomization Sample and Design.— Our sampling frame is defined as all
villages in the district of Faisalabad in Punjab province with at least 2 private
or NGO schools; 42 percent (334 out of 786) of villages in the district fall in
this category. Based on power calculations using longitudinal LEAPS data, we
sampled 266 villages out of the 334 eligible villages with a total of 880 schools, of
which 855 (97%) agreed to participate in the study.
Table 1 presents summary statistics from our sample at the village (Panel A)
and the private school level (Panel B). The median village has 2 public schools, 3
private schools and 416 children enrolled in private schools. The median private
school has 140 enrolled children, charges Rs. 201 in monthly fees, and reports
a monthly revenue of Rs. 26,485. Monthly variable costs are Rs. 16,200 and
annual fixed costs are Rs. 33,000, for an annual profit of Rs. 90,420. The range
of outcome variables is quite large. Relative to a mean of 164 students, the
5th percentile of enrollment is 45 compared to 353 at the 95th percentile of the
distribution. Similarly, fees range from Rs. 81 (5th percentile) to Rs. 503 (95th
percentile) and monthly revenues from Rs. 4,943 to Rs. 117,655. The kurtosis,
a measure of the density at the tails, is 17 for annual fixed expenses and 51
for revenues relative to a kurtosis of 3 for a standard normal distribution. Our
decision to include all schools in the market provides external validity, but has
implications for precision and mean imbalance, both of which we discuss.
19This excludes public schools, which cannot charge fees and lack control over hiring and pedagogic
decisions. In Andrabi et al. (2018), we study the impact of a parallel experiment with public schools
between 2004 and 2011. It also excludes 5 (out of close to 900) private schools that were part of a larger
school chain with schooling decisions taken at the central office rather than within each school.
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We use a two-stage stratified randomization design where we first assign each
village to one of three experimental groups and then schools within these villages
to treatment. Stratification is based on village size and village average revenues,
as both these variables are highly auto-correlated in our panel dataset (Bruhn
and McKenzie, 2009). Based on power calculations, 37 of the villages are assigned
to the L arm, and 27 to the H arm and the control group; a total of 342 schools
across 189 villages receive grant offers (see Appendix Figure C1). In the second
stage, for the L arm, we randomly select one school in the village to receive the
grant offer; in the H arm, all schools receive offers; and, in the control group, no
schools receive offers.
The randomization was conducted through a public computerized ballot in La-
hore on September 5, 2012, with third-party observers (funders, private school
owners and local NGOs) in attendance. The public nature of the ballot and
the presence of third-party observers ensured that there were no concerns about
fairness; consequently, we did not receive any complaints from untreated schools
regarding the assignment process. Once the ballot was completed, schools re-
ceived a text message informing them of their own ballot outcome. Given village
structures, information on which schools received the grant in the L arm was not
likely to have remained private, so we assume that the receipt of the grant was
public information.
Intervention.— We offer unconditional cash grants of Rs.50,000 (approximately
$500 in 2012) to every treated school in both L and H arms. The size of the grant
represents 5 months of operating profits for the median school and reflects both
our overall budget constraint and our estimate of an amount that would allow for
meaningful fixed and variable cost investments. For instance, the median wage
for a private school teacher in our sample is Rs. 24,000 per year; the grant thus
allows the school to hire 2 additional teachers a year. Similarly, the costs of desks
and chairs in the local markets range from Rs. 500 to Rs. 2,000, allowing the
school to purchase 25-100 additional desks and chairs.
We deliberately do not impose any conditions on the use of the grant apart from
submission of a (non-binding) business plan (see below). School owners retain
complete flexibility over how and when they spend the grant and the amount
they spend on schooling investments with no requirements of returning unused
funds. As we show below, most schools choose not to spend the full amount in the
first year and the total spending varies by the treatment arm. Our decision not to
impose any conditions follows our desire to provide policy-relevant estimates for
the simplest possible design; the returns we observe therefore provide a ‘baseline’
for what can be achieved through a relatively ‘hands-off’ approach to private
school financing.
Grant Disbursement.— All schools selected to receive grant offers are visited
three times. In the first visit, schools choose to accept or reject the grant offer: 95
16
percent (325 out of 342) of schools accept.20 School owners are informed that they
must (a) complete an investment plan to gain access to the funds and may spend
these funds on items that would benefit the school and (b) be willing to open a
one-time use bank account for cash deposits. Schools are given two weeks to fill
out the plan and must specify a disbursement schedule with a minimum of two
installments. In the second visit, investment plans are collected and installments
are released according to desired disbursement schedules.21 A third and final
disbursement visit is conducted once at least half of the grant amount has been
released. While schools are informed that failure to spend on items may result in
a stoppage of payments, in practice, as long as schools provide an explanation of
their spending or present a plausible account of why plans changed, the remainder
of the grant is released. As a result, all 322 schools receive the full amount of the
grant.
Design Confounders.— If the investment plan or the temporary bank account
affected decision making, our estimates will reflect an intervention that bundles
cash with these additional features. We discuss the plausibility of these channels
in Section IV.A below and use additional variation and tests in our experiment
to show that any contribution of these mechanisms to our estimated treatment
effects are likely small. In Section IV.A, we also discuss that the treatment unit in
a saturation experiment is a design variable; in our case, this unit could have been
either the village (total grants are equalized at the village level) or the school. We
chose the latter to compare schools in different treatment arms that receive the
same grant. Consequently, in the H arm, with a median of 3 private schools, the
total grant to the village is 3 times as large as to the L arm. Observed differences
between these arms could therefore reflect the equilibrium effects of the total
inflow of resources into villages, rather than the degree of financial saturation.
Again, using variation in village size, we show in section IV.A that this is unlikely
to be a concern since our results remain qualitatively the same when we compare
villages with similar per-capita grant inflow.
B. Data Sources
Between July 2012 and November 2014, we conducted a baseline survey and five
rounds of follow-up surveys. In each follow-up round, we survey all consenting
schools in the original sample and any newly opened schools.22
Our data come from three different survey exercises, detailed in Appendix C.
20Reasons for refusal include anticipated school closure; unwillingness to accept external funds; or a
failure to reach owners despite multiple attempts.
21At this stage, 3 schools refused to complete the plans and hence do not receive any funds. Our final
take-up is therefore 94% (322 out of 342 schools), with no systematic difference between the L and H
arms.
22There are 31 new school openings two years after baseline: 3 public and 28 private schools. 13
new private schools open in H villages, 10 in the L villages, and 5 in control villages. Given these small
numbers, we omit these schools from our analysis. Even though the overall number of school openings is
low, we find that H villages report a higher fraction of new schools relative to control, though this effect
is small at an increase of 2%. Our main results remain qualitatively similar if we include these schools
in our analyses with varying assumptions on their baseline value.
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We conduct an extended school survey twice, once at baseline and again 8 months
after treatment assignment in May 2013 (Round 1 in Appendix Figure C2), col-
lecting information on school characteristics, practices and management, as well
as household information on school owners. In addition, there are 4 shorter follow-
up rounds every 3-4 months that focus primarily on enrollment, fees and revenues.
Finally, children are tested at baseline and once more, 14 months after treatment
(Round 3). During the baseline, we did not have sufficient funds to test every
school and therefore administered tests to a randomly selected half of the sample
schools. We also never test children in public schools. At baseline, this decision
was driven by budgetary constraints and in later rounds we decided not to test
children in public schools because our follow-up surveys showed enrollment in-
creases of at most 30 children in treatment villages. Even if we were to assume
that these children came exclusively from public schools, this suggests that public
schools enrollment across all grades declined at most 2-3% on average. This effect
seemed too small to generate substantial impacts on public school quality.23
C. Regression Specification
We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects using the following school-level spec-
ification:24
Yijt = αs + δt + β1Hijt + β2L
t
ijt + β3L
u
ijt + γYij0 + ijt
Yijt is an outcome of interest for a school i in village j at time t, which is mea-
sured in at least one of five follow-up rounds after treatment. Hijt, L
t
ijt, and L
u
ijt
are dummy variables for schools assigned to high-saturation villages, and treated
and untreated schools in low-saturation villages respectively. We use strata fixed
effects, αs, since randomization was stratified by village size and revenues, and δt
are follow-up round dummies, which are included as necessary. Yij0 is the baseline
value of the dependent variable, and is used whenever available to increase preci-
sion and control for any potential baseline mean imbalance between the treated
and control groups (see discussion in section III.D). All regressions cluster stan-
dard errors at the village level and are weighted to account for the differential
probability of treatment selection in the L arm as unweighted regressions would
assign disproportionate weight to treated (untreated) schools in smaller (larger)
L villages relative to schools in the control or H arms (see Appendix B). Our
coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3, all of which identify the average ITT
effect for their respective group.
23Another option would have been to test those students at baseline whom we expected to be marginal
movers due to the treatment and see their gains from the switch. Detecting marginal movers ex-ante
however is a difficult especially given that churn is not uncommon in this setting.
24We focus on ITT effects and do not present other treatment effect estimates since take-up is near
universal at 94 percent.
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D. Validity
Balance.— Appendix Table D1 presents tests for baseline differences in means
and distributions as well as joint tests of significance across experimental groups
at the village (Panel A) and at the school level (Panel B). At the village level,
covariates are balanced across the three experimental groups (H, L and Control),
and village level variables do not jointly predict village treatment status for the
H or L arm.
Balance tests at the school level involve four experimental groups: Lt and Lu
schools; schools in the H arm; and untreated schools in control. Panel B shows
comparisons between control and each of the three treatment groups (cols 3-5)
and between the H and Lt schools (col 6), our other main comparison of interest.
5 out of 32 univariate comparisons (Panel B, cols 3-6) show mean imbalance at
p-values lower than 0.10— a fraction slightly higher than what we may expect
by random chance. If this imbalance leads to differential trends beyond what can
be accounted for through the inclusion of baseline variables in the specification,
our results for the Lt schools may be biased (Athey and Imbens, 2017). Despite
this mean imbalance however, our distributional tests are always balanced (Panel
B, colss 7-9), and, furthermore, covariates do not jointly predict any treatment
status. Nevertheless, we conduct a number of robustness checks in Appendix D
and show that the mean imbalance we observe is largely a function of heavy(right)-
tailed distributions arising from the inclusion of all schools in our sample and
trimming our data eliminates the imbalance without qualitatively changing our
treatment effects (see Appendix Tables D2 and D3).
Attrition.— Schools may exit from the study either due to closure, a treat-
ment effect of interest that we examine in Section IV.A, or due to survey refusals.
Survey completion rates in any given round are uniformly high (95% for rounds
1-4 and 90% for round 5), with only 14 schools refusing all follow-up surveys
(7 control, 5 H, and 2 Lu). Nevertheless, since round 5 was conducted 2 years
after baseline, we implemented a randomized procedure for refusals, where we
intensively tracked half of the schools who refused the survey in round 5 for an
interview. We apply weights to the data from this round to account for this
intensive tracking (see Appendix B for details). In regressions, we find that Lt
schools are less likely to attrit relative to control in every round (Appendix Ta-
ble D4, Panel A). For other experimental groups, attrition is more idiosyncratic.
Despite this differential attrition, baseline characteristics of those who refuse sur-
veying at least once do not vary by treatment status in more than 2 (of 21) cases,
which could occur by random chance (Appendix Table D4, Panel B).25 We check
robustness to attrition using inverse probability weights in Appendix Table D5,
discussed in greater detail in section IV.A, and find that our results are unaffected
25Comparing characteristics for the at-least-once-refused set is a more conservative approach than
looking at the always-refused set since the former includes idiosyncratic refusals. There are 14 schools
in the always-refused set however making inference difficult; nevertheless, when we do consider this set,
one significant difference emerges with lower enrollment in Lu relative to control schools.
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by this correction.
IV. Results
In this section, we present results on the primary outcomes of interest, inves-
tigate potential channels of impact, and discuss the implications and potential
welfare impact of our findings.
A. Main Results
Expenditures and Revenues
We first present evidence that the grant increased school expenditures; this is
of independent interest as school and household finances are fungible and school
owners had considerable leeway in how the grant could be spent. Table 2, column
1, shows that school fixed expenditures increased for Lt and H schools relative to
control in the first year after treatment; the magnitudes as a fraction of the grant
amount in the first year were 61% for Lt and 70% for the H schools. Fixed costs
primarily includes infrastructure-related investments, such as upgrading rooms or
new furniture and fixtures; spending on these items is consistent with self-reported
investment priorities in our baseline data.
The fact that schools increase their overall expenditures despite the grant being
(effectively) unconditional suggests that school investments offer better returns
relative to other investment options. While consistent with the presence of credit
constraints, investing in the school could also reflect the lower (zero) cost of fi-
nancing through a grant. In this context, Banerjee and Duflo (2012) suggest a
test to directly establish the presence of credit constraints. Suppose that firms
borrow from multiple sources. When cheaper credit (i.e. a grant) becomes avail-
able, if firms are not credit constrained, they should always use the cheaper credit
to pay off more expensive loans. In fact, they should draw down the expensive
loans to zero if credit is freely available. In Appendix Table E1, we examine
data on borrowing for school and household accounts of school owner households.
While there is limited borrowing for investing in the school, over 20% of school
owner households do borrow (presumably for personal reasons). Yet, we find no
statistically significant declines in borrowing at the school or household level as
a result of our intervention.
We now consider whether these expenditure changes affected school revenues.
Since schools may not always be able to fully collect fees from students, we use two
revenue measures: (i) posted revenues based on posted fees and enrollment (cols
2-4), calculated as the sum of revenues expected from each grade as given by the
grade-specific monthly tuition fee multiplied by the grade-level enrollment; and
(ii) collected revenues as reported by the school (cols 5-7).26 To obtain the latter
measure, we inspected the school account books and computed revenues actually
collected in the month prior to the survey.27 While this measure captures revenue
26Posted revenues are available for rounds 1,2, and 4, and collected revenues are available from rounds
2-5. We use baseline posted revenues as the control variable in all revenue regressions.
27Over 90% of schools have registers for fee payment collection, and for the remainder, we record
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shortfalls due to partial fee payment, discounts and reduced fees under exceptional
circumstances, it may not adjust appropriately for delayed fee collection.
First, there are substantial posted revenue increases in all treated schools. Col-
umn 2 shows that schools in the H arm gain Rs.5,484 (p=0.12) each month
while Lt schools gain Rs.10,665 (p=0.03) a month. Annual revenue increases
(twelve times the reported monthly coefficient estimates) compare favorably to
the Rs.50,000 grant amount for the returns on investment. In contrast, we never
find any significant change in revenues among Lu schools, with small coefficients
across all specifications. Second, the impact on collected revenues is similar for H
schools (Rs.4,400 with p=0.22), but is smaller (Rs.7,924, p=0.09) for Lt schools
(col 5). One explanation for this difference could be that marginal new children
pay lower (than posted) fees in Lt schools. We examine this in more detail later
(Table 3) when we decompose our revenue impacts into enrollment and school
fees. Third, the results are large but often imprecise due to the high variance in
the revenue distribution (the distribution is highly skewed with a skewness of 5.6
and kurtosis of 51.2); precision increases however when we either top-code the
data, assigning the 99th percentile value to the top 1% of data, or drop the top
1 percent of data (cols 3 & 6 and cols 4 & 7, respectively), and our results are
significant at conventional levels. We (still) cannot reject equality of coefficients
across the treatment arms of the intervention.28
Enrollment and Fees
Table 3 considers the impact of the grant on the two main components of
(posted) school revenue— school enrollment and fees— to shed light on the sources
of revenue changes and whether they differ across treatment arms.
Our first result is that school enrollment increased in Lt and H schools, where
enrollment is measured across all grades in a given school and coded as zero if a
school closed. Columns 1-3 examine enrollment impacts, annually in columns 1-2
and pooling across the two treatment years in column 3. In the first year, the
Lt schools enroll 19 additional children, representing a 12 percent increase over
baseline enrollment. This compares to an average increase of 9 children for H
schools (p=0.10). These gains are sustained and even higher in the second year
(col 2); the pooled estimate thus gives an overall increase of 22 children for Lt
schools (col 3). Appendix Table E2 shows that these gains are not grade-specific
with significant positive effects of 11-18 percent over baseline enrollment across
the grade distribution. We never observe an average impact on Lu schools, which
is consistent with our theory prediction: Schools should not increase capacity
beyond the point where they decrease the enrollment of their competitors, as this
can trigger severe price competition leading to lower profits for all schools.
Part of the higher enrollment among Lt schools is due to a reduction in the
self-reported fee collections.
28In this analysis, we assign a zero value to a school once it closes down. If instead, we restrict our
analysis to schools that remain open throughout the study with the caveat that these estimates partially
reflect selection, we still observe revenue impacts though they are smaller in magnitude, especially for Lt
schools. We discuss this further in Section IV.A when we break down the sources of revenue impacts.
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number of school closures. Over the period of our experiment, 13.7 percent of the
schools in the control group closed. As column 4 shows, Lt schools were 9 percent-
age points less likely to close over the study period. We find no average impact on
school closure for H or Lu schools relative to control. Although fewer school clo-
sures naturally imply higher enrollments for the average school (given that closed
schools are assigned zero enrollment), we emphasize that there were enrollment
gains among the schools that remained open throughout the study: Column 5
restricts the analysis sample to open schools only, and still shows higher enroll-
ment for H and Lt schools, though magnitudes for the latter are naturally smaller
for the latter relative to Column 3 (11.6 children, p=0.13). Conditioning on a
school remaining open without accounting for the selection into closure implies
that enrollment gains are likely biased downwards, as schools that closed tend to
have fewer children at baseline. This suggests that Lt schools not only staved off
closure, but also benefited through investments that increased enrollment among
open schools.
Understanding where this enrollment increase came from would have required
us to track over 100,000 children in these villages over time. Even with this
tracking, it would not have been possible to separately identify the children who
moved due to the experiment from regular churn. However, to the extent that
there is typically more entry at lower grades and greater drop-out in higher grades,
the fact that we see similar increase in both these grade levels suggests that both
new student entry (in lower grades) and greater retention (in higher grades) are
likely to have played a role.29
Unlike enrollment, which increased in both treatment arms, fees increased only
among H schools as seen in Table 3, columns 6-8. Average monthly tuition fees
across all grades in H schools is Rs.19 higher than control schools, an increase of
8 percent relative to the baseline fee (col 8). These magnitudes are similar across
the two years of the intervention. Appendix Table E4 also shows that all grades
experienced fee increases, with effect sizes ranging from 8-12% of baseline fee. As
higher grades have higher baseline fees, there is a hint of greater absolute increases
for grades 6 and above, but small sample sizes preclude further investigation of
this difference. In sharp contrast, we are unable to detect any impact on school
fees for either Lt or Lu schools. Consequently, we reject equality of coefficients
between H and Lt at a p-value of 0.02 (col 8).
These results use posted (advertised) fees, but actual fees paid by parents may
be different as collection rates may be below 100%. As we found previously, the
impacts on posted and collected revenues were similar for H schools, but not for
Lt schools, suggesting that collected fees may have been lower in these schools. We
29While noisier and limited to the tested grades, we can track enrollment using data on the tested
children. Doing so in Appendix Table E3, we find that Lt schools have a higher fraction of children who
report being newly enrolled in round 3, measured as attending their contemporaneous school for fewer
than 18 months from the date of treatment assignment (col 2). The data do not however allow us to
distinguish whether these children switched from other (public) schools in the village or were not-enrolled
at baseline but re-enrolled as a consequence of the treatment.
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confirm this in column 9 by computing collected fees as collected revenues divided
by school enrollment. These estimates are less precise than for posted fees, but
suggest that fees increased by Rs.29 in H schools (p=0.14) and decreased by Rs.8
(p=0.54) among Lt schools.30
Treated schools therefore respond to the same amount of cash grant in different
ways depending on the degree of financial saturation in their village. Consistent
with the predictions of our model, the main increase in revenue for Lt schools
comes from marginal children who may otherwise have not been in school, whereas
over half of the revenue increase among schools in H schools is from higher fees
charged to inframarginal children (which, as we examine below, likely reflects
increases in school quality).
Test Scores
We now examine whether increases in school revenues are accompanied by
changes in school quality, as measured by test scores. To assess this, we use
subject tests administered in Math, English and the vernacular, Urdu, to chil-
dren in all schools 16 months after the start of the intervention (near the end of
the first school year after treatment).31 We graded the tests using item response
theory, which allows us to equate tests across years and place them on a common
scale (Das and Zajonc, 2010). Appendix C provides further details on testing,
sample and procedures.
Columns 1 to 4 in Table 4 present school level test score impacts (unweighted
by the number of children in the school) and column 5 presents the impact at the
child level. While the latter is relevant for welfare computations, the school level
scores ensure comparability with our other (school level) outcome variables. To
improve precision, we include the baseline test score where available.32
Test score increases for H schools are comparably high in all subjects with co-
efficients ranging from 0.19sd in English (p=0.04) to 0.11sd in Urdu (p=0.12).
Averaged across subjects, children in H schools gain an additional 0.16sd, rep-
resenting a 42% additional gain relative to the (0.38sd) gain children in control
schools experience over the same 16-month period. In contrast, and consistent
with the school fee results, there are no detectable impacts on test scores for
schools in the L relative to control. Given this pattern, we also reject a test of
30This decline is consistent with our theory given heterogeneous consumer preferences over school
quality. With a downward sloping demand curve, schools would have to decrease their fees to bring in
more children as they increase capacity.
31As discussed previously, budgetary considerations precluded testing the full sample at baseline, so
we instead randomly chose half our villages for testing. In the follow-up round however, an average of 23
children from at least two grades were tested in each school, with the majority of tested children enrolled
in grades 3-5; in a small number of cases, children from other grades were tested if enrollment in these
grades was zero. In tested grades, all children were administered tests and surveys regardless of class
size; the maximum enrollment in any single class was 78 children.
32Since we randomly tested half our sample at baseline, we replace missing values with a constant
and an additional dummy variable indicating the missing value. In Appendix Table E5, we show that
alternate specifications that either exclude baseline controls (cols 1-4) or include additional controls
(cols 5-8) do not affect our results, with similar point estimates but a reduction in precision in some
specifications.
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equality of coefficients between H and Lt schools at p-value 0.07 (col 4). Finally,
column 5 shows that child level test score impacts are higher at 0.22sd, suggesting
that gains are higher in larger schools.
Given that enrollment increases across all grades and H schools see an addi-
tional enrollment of 9 children or 5% of baseline enrollment, compositional effects
would have to be unduly large to drive these effects. To formally assess this
claim, we first restrict the sample to those children who were in the same school
throughout our study, which includes 90% of all children in the follow-up round.
Average school level and child level test score increases for this restricted sample
are 0.14sd (p=0.09) and 0.24sd (p=0.01) for the H arm, respectively (Appendix
Table E6, col 4).33
One may also believe that test score increases reflect a change in the composition
of peers. Although we cannot rule out such peer effects, we note that Lt schools
gain more children but show no learning gains. Moreover, a school in the H
arm attracts an average of at most 1 new child into a tested grade average of
13 children. The peer effects from this single child would have to be very large
to induce the changes we see and is unlikely given the typical magnitude of such
effects in the literature (Sacerdote, 2011).
Finally, we tested at most two grades per school. Therefore, we cannot directly
examine whether children across all grades in the school have higher test scores
due to our treatment. Instead, we make two points: (i) average fees are higher
across all grades in H schools and insofar as fee increases are sustained through
test score increases, this suggests that test score increases likely occurred across all
grades; and (ii) if we examine test scores gains in the two tested grades separately,
we still observe positive (if imprecise) test score improvements in H schools for
each grade.
Robustness and Further Results
Our preferred explanation for the reduced form results— especially the dif-
ferential results between the treatment arms— relies on the strategic returns to
investing in quality when financial saturation in markets is high. We now ex-
amine factors in our design and analysis that could potentially confound this
interpretation.
Investment Plan.— Our intervention required every treated school to submit
an investment plan before any disbursement could take place. It is not obvious
how this requirement, by itself, could lead to the differential treatment effects we
observe, particularly as the experimental literature on business plans seldom finds
significant effects (McKenzie, 2017). Moreover, our process was designed to be
minimally invasive and effectively non-binding as schools could propose any plan
and change it at any time as long as they informed us.34 Nevertheless, consider the
two following channels of impact. The plan could either have forced school owners
33If stayers were positively selected in terms of their baseline test scores, this result would be biased
upwards; in fact, stayers have lower test scores at baseline in the H relative to control.
34Schools could propose investments with private value as long as they could argue it benefited the
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to consider new investments or, perhaps, the act of submission itself notionally
committed school owners to a course of action. We can show neither of these
channels is salient by drawing on three separate sources of (proposed and actual)
school investments: (a) pre-treatment proposed investment questions from the
baseline survey; (b) investment plan data; and (c) investments as reported in
the follow-up surveys. First, the correlation in proposed investments between (a)
and (b) is high, suggesting that simply asking schools about investment plans is
unlikely to explain our treatment effects since (a) is asked of both treatment and
control schools and (a) provides similar information to (b). Second, it also does
not seem that (b) was particularly binding as the correlation between investments
in (b) and (c) is low. Schools do not seem to have treated the business plan as a
commitment device; instead, owners appeared to have finalized school investments
after disbursement. Thus, it is unlikely that the submission of investment plans
induced the kinds of large effects we document here, and even less likely that it
induced differential effects between the treatment arms.
Bank Account.— In order to receive the grant funds, school owners had to open
a one-time use bank account with our banking partner. This begs the question:
Could this account opening have driven the effects we observe? In our sample,
73% of school owner households already had bank accounts at baseline and this
fraction is balanced across treatment arms. Further, in Appendix Table E7, we
use an interaction between treatment and baseline bank account availability to
check whether our pattern of treatment effects is driven by previously unbanked
households. We detect no statistically significant differential impact by baseline
bank account status.
Village level Resources.— Given our design preference for school level compar-
isons, the grant amount was the same for all schools regardless of treatment arm.
Therefore, grant per capita in a L village is necessarily always lower than in a
H village, holding constant village size. To investigate whether this difference
in overall resource availability at the village level can explain our results, we use
baseline variation in village size to additionally control for the per-capita grant
size in each village. If per-capita grant size is an omitted variable that is corre-
lated with treatment saturation and driving our results, we should find that the
additional inclusion of this variable drives the difference in our treatment coeffi-
cients to zero. We therefore replicate our base specifications including per-capita
grant size as an additional control in Appendix Table E8, columns 1-3. We find
that the qualitative pattern of our core results on enrollment, fees and test scores
is unchanged. Lt schools see higher enrollment on average, while H schools ex-
perience higher fees and test scores on average. While we lose precision in the H
arm, we cannot reject that these coefficients are identical to our base specification.
This suggests that alternative explanations based on equilibrium effects from an
school or spend the money on previously planned investments, thereby effectively using the grant for
personal uses. They could also propose changes to their plans at any time during the disbursement.
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increase in overall resources at the village level are unlikely.
Attrition:— As discussed previously, attrition in our data never exceeds 5% in
the first year and 10% in the second year of the study, and baseline characteristics
of attriters are similar across treatment groups (Appendix Table D4, Panel B).
Although attrition is higher in the second year of treatment, recall that wherever
available our first and second year estimates are similar (Table 3). This suggests
that any bias from increased attrition in the second year is likely small. Further-
more, our results are robust to using inverse probability weights to account for
higher attrition (see Appendix Table D5).
B. Channels
In this section, we consider potential channels of impact by examining changes
in school investments as a result of the grants. We first look at overall fixed and
variable costs and then focus on the main components of each— infrastructure
and teacher costs.
Overall Fixed and Variable Costs
Table 5 presents the average impacts of the intervention on (annualized) fixed
and variable costs. Fixed costs represent annual investments, usually before the
start of the school year, for school infrastructure (furniture, fixtures, classroom
upgrades) or educational materials (textbooks, school supplies); variable costs are
recurring monthly expenses on teacher salaries, the largest component of these
expenses, and non-teaching staff salaries, utilities, and rent. Columns 1-4 include
closed schools in the regressions assigning them zero costs once closed; cols 5-6
sum costs over the years; and cols 7-8 restrict the sample to schools that were
open throughout the study period.
To facilitate comparisons, column 1 repeats the regression presented in Table 2,
Column 1. Whereas in the first year, H schools spend Rs.34,950 and Lt schools
spend Rs.30,719 more than control schools on fixed costs, by the second year,
there is no detectable difference in fixed costs between the treated and control
schools (col 3). On the other hand, annualized variable costs are higher among H
schools and increase over time, though these estimates are imprecisely measured
at p-values of 0.20 (col 2 and 4). Cumulatively over two years, fixed costs are
higher in all treated schools (col 5 and 7), but variable costs are higher only in H
schools (col 6 and 8). Therefore, if we consider open schools only, we cannot reject
equality of coefficients between the treated groups for fixed costs (col 7), but can
reject equality in variable costs at a p-value of 0.02 (col 8). Since teacher salaries
comprise 75 percent of variable costs, H schools were likely spending more on
teachers after the intervention leading us to further investigate this in Table 7.
Infrastructure
For treated schools, infrastructure constitutes the largest fraction of fixed costs,
and although we cannot reject that the magnitudes are the same, H schools spend
Rs. 6,209 more on average than Lt schools (Table 6, column 1). Table 6 also pro-
vides evidence that spending on infrastructure components differs by treatment
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saturation. While we cannot reject equality of coefficients for H and Lt compar-
isons, relative to Lt schools, H schools purchase fewer desks and chairs (cols 2
and 3); are more likely to report increased access to computers, library and sports
facilities (cols 4-6); and report a higher number of upgraded classrooms (col 7).35
There are no further effects in year 2 (Appendix Table E9), which is consistent
with most schools choosing to front-load their investments at the beginning of
the school year immediately after they received the grant. If we are willing to
assume that libraries, computers and better classrooms contribute to learning,
these patterns are quite consistent with a focus on capacity expansion (desks
and chairs) among Lt schools and a greater emphasis on quality improvements
among H schools.36 This differential emphasis becomes clearer once we focus on
teachers.
Teachers
Table 7 shows that variable costs increase by Rs.3,145 per month among H
schools, but not in Lt schools, which if anything show a negative coefficient (col-
umn 1). This 12% increase in costs is in large part due to the significantly higher
wage bill for teachers in H relative to Lt schools (p = 0.05, column 2). There
is no significant average increase in the number of teachers employed at a school
(col 3); however, there is an increase in the number of new teachers in H schools
suggesting the presence of teacher churn (col 4). There are significant differences
in remuneration with greater monthly pay for teachers in H schools relative to
control. This pay differential emerges both for newly hired teachers (column 6)
and (to a slightly lesser degree) for existing teachers (column 7). The increase in
teacher wages is consistent with school owners increasing salaries to attract or re-
tain better teachers as previous evidence shows that in Pakistani private schools,
a 1sd increase in teacher value added is associated with 41% higher wages (Bau
and Das, 2016).
C. Discussion
Our results present a consistent narrative in terms of the use of grant funds, the
subsequent impacts, and the channels through which these impacts are realized.
Lt schools invest primarily in increasing capacity with no average changes in test
scores, and, as a result, bring in more children while collecting slightly lower fees
per child. On the other hand, H schools raise test scores and fees, with a smaller
increase in capacity. These different strategies are reflected in schools’ choice of
fixed and variable investments, with H schools more focused on teacher hiring,
remuneration and retention. These results are also consistent with the predictions
of our model. As long as increasing capacity does not impinge on the enrollment
of existing private schools (and it appears not to have done so), Lt schools act as
35A standard desk accommodates 2 students implying that 12 additional students can be seated in
H schools, and 18 students in Lt school; these numbers are similar in magnitude to the enrollment gains
documented earlier.
36While additional facilities could justify increasing prices, the per-student availability of desks and
chairs in Lt schools was arguably the same, although there is an increase in the availability of computers.
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monopolists on the residual demand from other schools. This option is no longer
available when all schools receive the funds, as capacity enhancements among all
schools will trigger a price war. The only option then is to expand the size of the
market through quality investments and this is indeed what we observe in the
data.
Welfare Comparisons.— The differential responses between the low and high-
saturation arms naturally raise the question of whether the public sector has a role
to play in this financing model for private schools, which depends on the computed
benefits of the intervention for different groups. Since estimating demand curves
requires household choice data (which we do not have), we use the experimental
estimates together with a linear parametrization of the demand curve to compute
the gains that accrue to schools owners, parents, teachers and children. Consid-
ering child test scores beyond the parental consumer surplus calculation allows us
to incorporate the idea that there may be social externalities from learning gains
beyond the direct benefits to parents. The key intuition driving our comparison is
that when quality remains the same, gains in consumer surplus are concentrated
among inframarginal consumers, as the welfare gains from new, ‘marginal’, en-
rollees is small given they are indifferent between attending the school or not
prior to the intervention. However, on the producer side, gains in firm profits
depend entirely on new enrollment among marginal consumers. Consequently,
when schools expand enrollment without increasing quality, increases in profits
can be substantial even as the change in consumer surplus is small. When schools
improve quality and quantity, consumers accrue the benefits of higher quality and
an implicit decline in price at the higher quality required to bring in new students.
We start by considering the exact policy analogue to our experiment, where
a government decides to give unconditional grants to private schools but faces a
budget constraint. With a total grant budget of PKR 150K, it can either provide
(i) PKR 50K to one school each in three villages (L treatment), or (ii) PKR
50K to each of the three schools in one village (H treatment). The table below
shows welfare computations for Lt and H schools, giving monetary returns for
the first three beneficiary groups and test score increases for children; we omit
consideration of Lu schools in these calculations given the lack of any detectable
impacts. The monetary returns are monthly, while the test score increases are
from a snapshot in time 16 months after treatment. We should emphasize that
these calculations, especially for consumer surplus are necessarily speculative and
often require strong assumptions.37 Details of the computations are provided in
37For consumer surplus computations, we assume that (a) the demand curve can be approximated
as linear and (b) regardless of quality, demand at zero price in the village is fixed at an upper-bound,
which follows in our case from the assumption of ‘closed’ markets. For test score increases, we examine
the overall standard deviation increase from the grant. As Dhaliwal et al. (2013) discuss, this assumes
that gains across students are perfectly substitutable and returns are linear. Finally, we use point
estimates from our experiment regardless of statistical significance. We could alternatively only consider
statistically significant estimates and assume 0 values for statistically insignificant coefficients. While
doing so does not qualitatively alter our results, we prefer the approach taken.
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Appendix F. For school owners and teachers, the calculations are standard and
In PKR Standard Deviations
Group Owners Teachers Parents Children
Lt 10,918 -2,514 4,080 61.1
H 5,295 8,662 7,560 117.2
are based on the monthly variable profits (the estimated impacts on collected
revenues minus variable costs) and the teacher wage bill, respectively. Turning to
consumer surplus, recall that there is no change in quality for Lt schools, but there
is a decline in collected fees and an increase in enrollment. Following standard
welfare computations, the first order gain of these changes are realized among
those already enrolled. In the H arm, since both quality and prices increase, we
compute the consumer surplus increase along the new demand curve at higher
quality. Finally, the last column in the table shows the total increase in test scores
for children in the village.38
These estimates highlight the tension between the two treatment arms. While
the L arm is substantially better in terms of school owner profitability, social
returns (including parents, teachers and children) are likely higher in the H arm.
Viewed as a policy of providing unconditional grants, the H arm offers favorable
(learning) returns relative to other educational RCTs as well.39 If we believe that
educational interventions should primarily focus on learning with limited weight
on school owner profits, the H approach is clearly preferable.
Policy Response.— Thus far, we have evaluated a policy of a grant, but our
estimates of financial return suggest that lending should be privately profitable
in both the low or the high-saturation model. Specifically, our financial returns
calculations give an internal rate of return (IRR) of 61-83% for Lt schools and
12%-32% for H schools for 2-year and 5-year scenarios (see Appendix F).40 As
interest rates on loans to this sector range from 15-20%, the IRR almost always
exceeds the market interest rate: Lt schools would be able to pay back a Rs.50,000
loan in 1.5 years whereas H schools would take four years. Even though returns in
38While test score increases for children already in private schools at baseline are captured by our
treatment effects, we also need to account for test scores increases that may have been experienced by
newly enrolled children. Since this cannot be identified from the data, we assume test score gains of
0.33sd for new children, which is the gain for children switching from government to private schools in
Punjab (Andrabi et al., 2017).
39This represents a gain of 7.8sd for every $100 invested in H and a gain of 4.1sd for Lt schools.
Relative to the literature (JPAL, 2017), these are highly cost-effective interventions— the median test
score gain in the literature is 2.3sd per $100.
40For the 2-year scenario we use actual returns estimated over the two year period and then assume
no further returns accrue thereafter and any assets accumulated are resold at 50% value. For the 5-year
scenario we assume the revenue impact lasts for 5 years and is zero thereafter and any assets have 0 value
at the end of the period.
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both treatment arms pass a market interest rate threshold, from the perspective
of an investor, investing using a low-saturation approach is more desirable.
The above calculus suggests that left to the market, a monopolist lender will
favor the L approach as long as the (village level) fixed costs of financing are not
too large. If a government or a social planner prefers the H approach instead, we
can ask what level of subsidy would make the private lender indifferent between
the two approaches. Our results point towards a loan-loss guarantee for banks,
which would encourage greater market saturation by mitigating the higher default
risk from the H approach (as the rate of school closures is 1% for Lt schools
compared to 8% for the H schools).
We show in Appendix F that a loan loss guarantee of Rs.17,363 over a two
year period for a total loan value of Rs.150K would make banks indifferent be-
tween the two approaches.41 To evaluate this policy, we compare the subsidy
to the additional consumer surplus generated from the H approach, which is
Rs.41,760 a year, computed as the difference in consumer surplus between the
two arms ([Rs.7,560-Rs.4,080]*12). Thus, such a policy passes the test required
for a Pigouvian subsidy— households should themselves to be willing to offer such
a loan-loss guarantee, with gains for both firms and households. Interestingly, this
policy also differs somewhat from standard “priority sector” lending policies in
that the subsidy is not based on a sectoral preference per se but rather on the
“density/saturation” of the financial offering by a lender.
V. Conclusion
Alleviating financial constraints of (private) schools by providing unconditional
grants leads to significants gains in enrollment and/or learning. In addition, vary-
ing the design of the financial infusion through the degree of market saturation
affects the margins of improvement. Consistent with theory, when all schools in a
given market receive grants, they have a greater incentive to invest in quality to
avoid a price war by competing over the same set of students. Further, and con-
sistent with the emphasis on capacity versus quality, in low-saturation villages,
schools invest in basic infrastructure or on capacity-focused investments, while
schools in high-saturation villages invest in both capacity and quality-focused in-
vestments. Most starkly, these schools invest more in teachers by paying higher
salaries. Alleviating credit constraints for a wider set of market participants thus
“crowds-in” higher quality service provision.
Our estimates suggest that the financial returns to investing in the low-cost
(private) educational sector are large and above normal market lending rates,
especially in the low-saturation case. This raises questions about why financial
41This calculation makes the conservative assumption that schools that shutdown will not pay back
any of their loan. In practice, from ongoing work, we note that default in the case of school closure is
never 100%. Moreover, the first instance of default, missing a cycle of payment, in this sector typically
occurs about 7 months after loan disbursement, and even then owners often end up partially repaying
the remaining loan amount. Furthermore, even if school owners decide to close the school, they will often
continue to pay back the loan. The risks to the lender are therefore quite minimal.
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players haven’t entered this sector. We maintain this is yet another market failure
as lenders perceive this market to be risky. These concerns may be legitimate—
after all, even if schools make money, they may choose not to repay their loans.
However, in an ongoing collaboration with a micro-finance provider where we
extend loans to private schools, our preliminary results show that lending to this
sector is working well with relatively high take-up and very low default rates.
Yet, even when one is able to catalyze the private sector to start lending in
this space, there remains the question of financial saturation. Barring cost of
delivery considerations, for a monopolist financial intermediary seeking to max-
imize returns the decision is quite straight-forward–— invest in single schools
using the low-saturation approach. Indeed, this approach to venture funding is
what we typically see for larger players in the education sector worldwide, whether
through investments in franchises or in single schools. Surprisingly, our approach,
which selected a school at random led to higher IRR than the typical approach
of picking a franchise or single school. Existing financial models can also enable
the emergence of monopolies. Already in our data, we find that schools in low-
saturation villages increase revenues only through increases in market share and
although we do not explicitly model this (we do not have an empirical counter-
part as our grant size is small relative to market revenue), it is straightforward to
construct situations where a low-saturation approach wipes out the competition.
In contrast, in the high-saturation villages, while school level financial return is
lower, we observe large test score gains across all children enrolled in the village
and, as we suggest above, potentially higher social gains. Thus, a government
seeking to enhance child learning may favor the latter approach because it helps
crowd-in more investments in quality that benefit students. This is not a new
trade-off— governments can always alleviate market constraints in a way that
allow select providers to flourish and grow rapidly or in a manner that enhances
rather than curtails competition. Ultimately, this is a judgment call that each
government will need to make and will critically depend on the nature of market
competition, market demand, and the production function facing providers. Our
work emphasizes that the educational marketplace is remarkably similar to other
sectors in this regard, with arguably greater social and long-term consequences.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable Mean 5th6pctl 25th6pctl Median 75th6pctl 95th6pctl
Standard6
Deviation N
Number6of6public6schools 2.45 1.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 1.03 266
Number6of6private6schools 3.33 2.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 7.0 1.65 266
Private6enrollment 523.52 149.0 281.0 415.5 637.0 1,231.0 378.12 266
Enrollment 163.6 45.0 88.0 140.0 205.0 353.0 116.0 851
Monthly6fee6(PKR) 238.4 81.3 150.0 201.3 275.0 502.5 166.1 851
Monthly6revenue6(PKR) 40,181.1 4,943.0 13,600.0 26,485.0 44,400.0 117,655.0 54,883.9 850
Monthly6variable6costs6(PKR) 25,387.0 3,900.0 9,400.0 16,200.0 27,200.0 79,000.0 30,961.1 848
Annual6fixed6expenses6(PKR) 78,860.9 0.0 9,700.0 33,000.0 84,000.0 326,000.0 136,928.2 837
School6age6(No6of6years) 8.3 0.0 3.0 7.0 12.0 19.0 6.7 852
Number6of6teachers 8.2 3.0 5.0 7.0 10.0 17.0 4.8 851
Monthly6teacher6salary6(PKR) 2,562.8 1,000.0 1,500.0 2,000.0 2,928.5 5,250.0 3,139.5 768
Number6of6enrolled6children6in6
tested6grade
13.1 1.0 5.0 10.0 18.0 34.5 11.7 420
Number6of6tested6children 11.7 1.0 4.0 9.0 16.0 31.5 10.6 420
Average6test6score O0.21 O1.24 O0.59 O0.22 0.15 0.84 0.64 401
Notes:
a)6This6table6displays6summary6statistics6for6the62666villages6(Panel6A)6and6the68556private6schools6(Panel6B)6in6our6sample.
b)6These6baseline6data6come6from6two6sources:6school6surveys6administered6to6the6full6sample6(8556schools),6and6child6tests
administered6to6half6of6the6sample6(4206schools).6Any6missing6data6are6due6to6school6refusals,6child6absences6or6zero6enrollment
in6the6tested6grades6at666schools.
Table61:6Baseline6Summary6Statistics6
Panel&A:&Village&level&Variables
Panel&B:&&Private&School&level&Variables&
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Table 2—Expenditures and Revenues
Fixed Costs (annual) Overall Posted Revenues (monthly) Overall Collected Revenues (monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year 1 Full Top Coded 1% Trim Top 1% Full Top Coded 1% Trim Top 1%
High 34,950.4*** 5,484.4 5,004.5* 4,771.6** 4,400.0 4,642.0* 3,573.4*
(9,915.1) (3,532.4) (2,602.0) (2,203.3) (3,589.0) (2,413.2) (1,933.3)
Low Treated 30,719.2** 10,665.6** 9,327.2** 8,254.0** 7,923.7* 6,991.8** 5,399.5*
(11,883.9) (4,882.8) (3,976.0) (3,711.7) (4,623.2) (3,252.5) (2,896.0)
Low Untreated 5,086.9 -549.8 -684.5 328.7 494.4 430.9 737.6
(10,107.9) (2,750.1) (2,345.6) (1,887.7) (2,560.2) (2,225.9) (1,711.9)
Baseline 0.2*** 1.0*** 1.0*** 0.9*** 0.8*** 0.9*** 0.7***
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
R-Squared 0.11 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.55 0.62 0.53
Observations 794 2,459 2,459 2,423 3,214 3,214 3,166
# Schools (Rounds) 794 (1) 832 (3) 832 (3) 820 (3) 831 (4) 831 (4) 820 (4)
Mean Depvar 78,860.9 40,181.0 38,654.1 36,199.2 30,865.0 30,208.8 27,653.0
Test pval (H=0) 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.22 0.06 0.07
Test pval (Lt=0) 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.06
Test pval (Lt=H) 0.73 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.52 0.52 0.55
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a) This table examines annual fixed costs and monthly revenues. The dependent variable in column 1 is annual fixed costs
in year 1, which includes spending on infrastructure and educational supplies. The remaining columns look at overall
monthly revenues pooled across years 1 and 2. Cols 2-4 consider posted revenues, defined as the sum of revenues expected
from each grade based on enrollment and posted fees. Cols 5-7 consider collected revenues, defined as revenues actually
collected from all students at the school. Both revenue measures are coded as 0 once a school closes. Top coding of the
data assigns the value at the 99th percentile to the top 1% of data. Trimming top 1% of data assigns a missing value to
data above the 99th pctl. Both top coding and trimming are applied to each round of data separately.
b) Regressions are weighted to adjust for sampling and tracking where necessary, include strata and round fixed effects,
with standard errors clustered at village level. The number of observations may vary across columns as data are pooled
across rounds and not all outcomes are measured in every round. We thus also report the unique number of schools and
rounds in each regression; any variation in the number of schools arises from attrition or missing values for some
variables. The mean of the dependent variable is its baseline value or the follow-up control mean.
c) The bottom panel shows p-values from tests that either ask whether we can reject a zero average impact for high (H=0)
and low treated (Lt=0) schools, or whether we can reject equality of coefficients between high and low treated (Lt=H) schools.
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Table 3—School Enrollment and Fees (Monthly)
Enrollment (All) Closure Enrollment (Open) Posted Fees Collected Fees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year 1 Year 2 Overall Overall Overall Year 1 Year 2 Overall Per Child
High 8.86 9.12 9.01 -0.02 8.95* 17.68** 21.04** 18.83** 29.48
(5.38) (7.99) (6.04) (0.03) (5.10) (7.63) (10.27) (7.88) (20.15)
Low Treated 18.83*** 26.02*** 21.80*** -0.09*** 11.57 1.93 -2.51 0.51 -7.69
(7.00) (10.01) (7.73) (0.03) (7.63) (7.93) (9.43) (7.48) (12.42)
Low Untreated -0.31 1.00 0.31 -0.03 -2.43 0.07 -0.38 -0.00 3.37
(5.09) (7.23) (5.51) (0.03) (5.41) (6.24) (9.13) (6.49) (10.45)
Baseline 0.78*** 0.72*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.63***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R-Squared 0.69 0.53 0.62 0.05 0.63 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.14
Observations 2,454 1,605 4,059 855 3,599 1,563 749 2,312 2,949
# Schools (Rounds) 827 (3) 826 (2) 836 (5) 855 (1) 742 (5) 796 (2) 749 (1) 800 (3) 782 (4)
Mean Depvar 163.6 163.6 163.6 0.1 171.5 238.1 238.1 238.1 238.1
Test pval (H=0) 0.10 0.25 0.14 0.60 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.14
Test pval (Lt=0) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.81 0.79 0.95 0.54
Test pval (Lt=H) 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.72 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.08
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a) This table examines school enrollment and average monthly tuition fees across all grades. Columns 1-3 look at enrollment in
year 1 and 2, and overall across the two years of the study, respectively. Enrollment is 0 once a school closes down. Col 4
examines closure rates two years after treatment. Col 5 repeats col 3 restricting the sample to schools that remain open
throughout the study. Cols 6-8 show effects on monthly tuition fees charged in year 1 and 2 and overall, respectively. Tuition
fees are averaged across all grades taught at the school, and are coded as missing for closed schools. Col 9 shows collected
fees per child, and is constructed by dividing monthly collected revenues by enrollment in each round.
b) Regressions are weighted to adjust for sampling and tracking where necessary and include strata and round fixed effects, with
standard errors clustered at village level. The number of observations may vary across columns as data are pooled across rounds
and not all outcomes are measured in every round. We thus also report the number of schools and round for each regression; any
variation in the number of schools arises from attrition or missing values for some variables. The mean of the dependent
variable is its baseline value or the follow-up control mean.
c) The bottom panel shows p-values from tests that either ask whether we can reject a zero average impact for high (H=0) and low
treated (Lt=0) schools, or whether we can reject equality of coefficients between high and low treated (Lt=H) schools.
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Table 4—Test Scores
School level Child level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math English Urdu Avg Avg
High 0.16* 0.19** 0.11 0.15* 0.22**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Low Treated -0.07 0.08 -0.08 -0.03 0.10
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Low Untreated 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Baseline 0.27** 0.43*** 0.25** 0.36*** 0.63***
(0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05)
R-Squared 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.21
Observations 725 725 725 725 12,613
# Schools (Rounds) 725 (1) 725 (1) 725 (1) 725 (1) 719 (1)
Mean Depvar -0.21 -0.18 -0.24 -0.21 -0.19
Test pval (H=0) 0.08 0.05 0.18 0.07 0.02
Test pval (Lt=0) 0.50 0.43 0.45 0.79 0.33
Test pval (Lt=H) 0.03 0.33 0.07 0.07 0.24
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a) This table examines impacts on school and child level test scores. Columns 1-3
construct school test scores by averaging child scores for a given subject from a
given school; Col 4 shows the average score (across all subjects) for the school.
Col 5 shows the average (across all subjects) score at the child level. We tested
two grades at endline between grades 3-6, and grade 4 at baseline. In columns
1-4, we use all available test scores, and child composition may be different
between baseline and endline.
b) Regressions are weighted to adjust for sampling and include strata fixed effects,
with standard errors clustered at village level. We include a dummy variable
for the untested sample at baseline across all columns and replace the baseline
score with a constant. Since the choice of the testing sample at baseline was
random, this procedure allows us to control for baseline test scores wherever
available. The number of observations and schools are the same since test scores
are collected once after treatment. The number of schools is lower than the full
sample in round 3 due to attrition (39 schools refused surveying), closure (57
schools closed down), zero enrollment in the tested grades (9 schools), and
missing values for the remaining schools. The mean of the dependent variable is
the test score for those tested at random at baseline.
c) The bottom panel shows p-values from tests that either ask whether we can
reject a zero average impact for high (H=0) and low treated (Lt=0) schools, or
whether we can reject equality of coefficients between high and low treated
(Lt=H) schools.
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Table 5—Fixed and Variable Costs (Annual)
Year 1 Year 2 Cumulative Cumulative (Open Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable Fixed Variable
High 34,950.4*** 26,108.5 2,560.1 34,961.9 39,202.0*** 72,241.5* 42,570.5*** 103,181.5**
(9,915.1) (20,508.3) (6,868.1) (27,985.1) (10,792.0) (38,049.5) (11,866.0) (40,227.5)
Low Treated 30,719.2** -8,133.1 6,207.0 13,943.1 42,630.4*** 26,609.9 38,353.5** 1,154.6
(11,883.9) (25,486.1) (9,063.6) (20,355.2) (14,199.2) (38,284.8) (15,018.8) (39,812.1)
Low Untreated 5,086.9 1,402.7 4,992.3 2,656.0 10,509.8 34,854.1 9,595.2 33,530.2
(10,107.9) (17,596.0) (7,904.8) (19,907.5) (11,732.7) (33,815.7) (12,814.7) (34,829.3)
Baseline 0.2*** 0.9*** 0.0* 0.9*** 0.2*** 1.1*** 0.2*** 1.1***
(0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1)
R-Squared 0.11 0.71 0.05 0.60 0.10 0.56 0.09 0.57
Observations 794 817 768 777 837 842 745 747
# Schools (Rounds) 794 (1) 817 (1) 768 (1) 777 (1) 837 (1) 842 (1) 745 (1) 747 (1)
Mean Depvar 78,860.9 304,644.2 78,860.9 304,644.2 78,860.9 304,644.2 82,453.9 319,550.0
Test pval (H=0) 0.00 0.20 0.71 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01
Test pval (Lt=0) 0.01 0.75 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.49 0.01 0.98
Test pval (Lt=H) 0.73 0.23 0.67 0.42 0.81 0.28 0.78 0.02
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a) This table looks at the treatment impact on annualized fixed and variable costs. Annualized fixed costs include spending on
infrastructure or educational materials and supplies; annualized variable costs include recurring expenses— teaching and
non-teaching staff salaries, utilities and rent. Columns 1-2 show these costs for year 1, and cols 3-4 for year 2. Closed schools
are coded as having 0 costs in cols 1-4. Cols 5-6 show cumulative fixed and variable costs across the two years of the study, i.e.
instead of pooling, these columns sum data across rounds. Cols 7-8 repeat cols 5-6 restricting to those schools that remain open
throughout the experiment.
b) Regressions are weighted to adjust for sampling and tracking where necessary and include strata fixed effects, with
standard errors clustered at village level. The number of observations and unique schools are the same since we either show one
round of data (cols 1-4) or show cumulative costs across rounds (cols 5-8). Observations vary across year 1 and 2 due to
attrition and missing values for some schools. The mean of the dependent variable is its baseline value.
c) The bottom panel shows p-values from tests that either ask whether we can reject a zero average impact for high (H=0) and
low treated (Lt=0) schools, or whether we can reject equality of coefficients between high and low treated (Lt=H) schools.
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Table 6—School Infrastructure (Year 1)
Spending Number purchased Facility present (Y/N) Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Amount Desks Chairs Computers Library Sports # Rooms Upgraded
High 25,460.31*** 5.97*** 3.76*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 0.10** 0.70***
(8,787.82) (1.63) (1.40) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.26)
Low Treated 19,251.19** 8.71*** 6.13** 0.17*** -0.03 -0.03 0.47
(8,702.52) (2.45) (2.76) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.40)
Low Untreated -1,702.36 1.31 0.87 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.16
(8,376.89) (1.40) (1.19) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.26)
Baseline 0.09*** 0.10* 0.12* 0.26*** 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.71***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.57
Observations 798 810 811 822 822 822 822
# Schools (Rounds) 798 (1) 810 (1) 811 (1) 822 (1) 822 (1) 822 (1) 822 (1)
Mean Depvar 57,258.48 14.59 10.92 0.39 0.35 0.19 6.36
Test pval (H=0) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
Test pval (Lt=0) 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.58 0.49 0.24
Test pval (Lt=H) 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.60 0.01 0.01 0.59
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a) This table examines outcomes relating to school infrastructure using data from round 1. Column 1 is the
annual (fixed) expenditure on infrastructure– e.g. furniture, fixtures, or facilities. Columns 2-3 refer to the
number of desks and chairs purchased; columns 4-6 are dummy variables for the presence of particular school
facilities; and column 7 measures the number of rooms upgraded from temporary to permanent or semi-permanent
classrooms. Closed schools take on a value of 0 in all columns.
b) Regressions are weighted to adjust for sampling and include strata fixed effects, with standard errors
clustered at the village level. The number of observations and unique schools are the same since we use one
round of data. Observations may vary across year 1 and 2 due to attrition and missing values. The mean of the
dependent variable is its baseline value.
c) The bottom panel shows p-values from tests that either ask whether we can reject a zero average impact for
high (H=0) and low treated (Lt=0) schools, or whether we can reject equality of coefficients between high and
low treated (Lt=H) schools.
40
Table 7—Teacher Salaries and Composition
School Costs (monthly) Teacher Roster Teacher Salaries (monthly)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Wage Bill Total Num New All New Existing
High 3,147.48* 2,741.83* 0.42 0.46** 519.52** 580.05** 492.01*
(1,894.67) (1,510.50) (0.32) (0.18) (257.94) (265.80) (284.29)
Low Treated -1,127.41 -838.26 0.32 0.27 -175.63 -89.45 -223.10
(1,716.66) (1,520.25) (0.33) (0.24) (273.11) (406.49) (246.45)
Low Untreated -302.25 65.14 0.25 0.25 194.48 89.47 253.39
(1,374.56) (1,106.67) (0.29) (0.18) (202.53) (236.07) (201.69)
Baseline 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.77***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
R-Squared 0.69 0.63 0.50 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.20
Observations 1,470 1,470 1,590 1,645 11,725 3,903 7,818
# Schools (Rounds) 797 (2) 797 (2) 816 (2) 840 (2) 802 (2) 723 (2) 793 (2)
Mean Depvar 25,387.0 19,491.2 6.7 2.0 2,676.6 2,665.5 2,681.9
Test pval (H=0) 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.08
Test pval (Lt=0) 0.51 0.58 0.33 0.25 0.52 0.83 0.37
Test pval (Lt=H) 0.05 0.05 0.78 0.45 0.04 0.13 0.04
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
a) This table looks at impacts on teacher salaries and composition from the intervention. The dependent
variable in column 1 is monthly variable costs, which includes utilities, rent, teaching and
non-teaching staff salaries, over two years of the experiment. Column 2 shows the impact on the teaching
salary component of variable costs. Data used in the first two columns are from school survey data. The
remaining columns use teacher level data from the teacher roster. Columns 3-4 collapse data at the school
level to understand changes in teacher composition; cols 5-7 decompose teacher salaries by employment
status at the school before and after treatment. Whether a teacher is new or existing is determined by
their start date at the school relative to baseline. Closed schools are coded as missing in all columns,
except cols 3-4 where they are coded as 0.
b) Regressions are weighted to adjust for sampling and tracking where necessary and include strata
and round fixed effects, with have standard errors clustered at village level. The number of observations
may vary across columns as data are pooled across rounds and not all outcomes are measured in every
round. We thus also report the unique number of schools and rounds in each regression; any variation in
the number of unique schools arises from attrition or missing values for some variables. The mean of the
dependent variable is the baseline value or the follow-up control mean.
c) The bottom panel shows p-values from tests that either ask whether we can reject a zero average impact
for high (H=0) and low treated (Lt=0) schools, or whether we can reject equality of coefficients
between high and low treated (Lt=H) schools.
